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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Practice and Procedure-Service Upon Foreign Corporations-
Corporate Presence
Defendant railroad, a foreign corporation which had no tracks or
other property in North Carolina, employed a traveling freight and
passenger agent, who maintained an office at Winston-Salem. His job
was to solicit business by inducing the manufacturers in the western part
of the state to route their shipments to other parts of the country in
such a way that defendant would be one of the connecting carriers. To
further his employer's interests, the agent entertained a group of ship-
pers' representatives, one of whom was plaintiff's intestate. The party
was transported in an automobile belonging to the agent, and as a result
of his negligence an accident resulted, in which plaintiff's intestate was
killed. Suit was brought in North Carolina, the defendant being sum-
moned by service on the agent. The corporation appeared specially and
moved for dismissal on the ground that the service was void because
the soliciting agent was not an agent for service of process within the
purview of the statute governing service upon non-residents.1 A denial
of this motion by the lower court was reversed on appeal. The Supreme
Court of North Carolina held that a foreign corporation could not be
served with process unless it was found within the state, exercising
some of the functions for which it was created ("doing business").
Solicitation of interstate shipments, the court ruled, was an activity
which was purely incidental to the business of a common carrier. It
was not sufficient to constitute "doing business" so as to make the cor-
poration amenable to the jurisdiction of the local courts.2
This decision is a clear example of the application of the "corporate
presence" test, which was conceived by the United States Supreme
Court as a means of determining the jurisdictional status of a foreign
corporation in regard to local suit,3 and which has, for some years,
4
become firmly entrenched in both the state and federal courts, Under
this test, it is said that if the corporation is carrying on sufficient activ-
ities within the state to constitute "doing business," it is "present" there
and consequently subject to local process. Whether the company is
1 Service was made under N. C. GEIr. STAT. §1-97 (1943).
Lambert v. Schell, 235 N. C. 21, 69 S. E. 2d 11 (1952).
'Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U. S. 264 (1917) ; Inter-
national Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 579 (1897).
' The "corporate presence" test appears outmoded in the light of the language
of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310 (1945).
1E.g., Allentown Record Co., Inc. v. Agrashell, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 790 (E. D.
Penn. 1951); Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N. Y. 259, 115 N. E. 915
(1917); C. T. H. Corp. v. Maxwell, 212 N. C. 803, 195 S. E. 36 (1938); Ivey
River Land and Timber Co. v. National Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 192 N. C.
115, 133 S. E. 424 (1926); Shambe v. Delaware and H. R. Co., 288 Pa. 240,
246, 135 Atl. 755, 757 (1927).
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"doing business" is decided upon all the facts of each case." The
amount of activity implied by the term "doing business" may vary with
the context, for "licensing and taxing laws have been held to contem-
plate more extensive activities than would be required . . . to bring a
corporation into the jurisdiction of the court."'7 If the rationale of
the "corporate presence" rule is to be consistently adhered to, the origin
and nature of the cause of action would appear to be immaterial for the
purpose of service, once the "presence" of the corporation has been
established. Some courts therefore have held that causes of action aris-
ing from activities which took place outside the state and which were
unrelated to the acts which occurred within the forum could fall within
the jurisdiction of the local courts.8 Others have refused to allow serv-
ice of process in such cases. 9
The activities performed within the state must be some substantial
part of the ordinary business of the corporation ;1O mere isolated acts
or transitory actions will not suffice." Solicitation of business, which
People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U. S. 79, 87 (1918);
Toothill v. Raymond Laboratories, 100 F. Supp. 350 (E. D. N. Y. 1951) ; Harri-
son v. Corley, 226 N. C. 184, 37 S. E. 2d 489 (1946) ; Ivey River Land and Timber
Co. v. National Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 192 N. C. 115, 133 S. E. 424 (1926).
' State Highway and Public Works Commission v. Diamond Steamship Corp.,
225 N. C. 198, 202, 34 S. E. 2d 78, 80 (1945). Cf. Davis-Wood Lumber Co. v.
Ladner, 210 Miss. 863, 50 So. 2d 615 (1951); C. T. H. Corp. v. Maxwell, 212
N. C. 803, 195 S. E. 36 (1938). For a discussion of this "double standard," see
45 MicH. L. REv. 218 (1946).
"Missouri K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Reynolds, 255 U. S. 565 (1921); Perkins v.
Louisville & N. R. Co., 94 F. Supp. 946 (S. D. Cal. 1951); Steele v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., 206 N. C. 220, 173 S. E. 583 (1934) Subsequent decisions
of the North Carolina Supreme Court, in King v. Robinson Transfer Motor Lines.
219 N. C. 223, 13 S. E. 2d 233 (1941) ; Hamilton v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp.,
220 N. C. 815, 18 S. E. 2d 367 (1942); and Central Motor Lines v. Brooks
Transportation Co., 225 N. C. 733, 36 S. E. 2d 271 (1945), have distinguished this
case, and it would appear to be no longer sound authority. For an extreme
decision, see Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij v. Superior Court, 237 P. 2d
297 (Dist. Ct. App. Cal. 1951), where the California court asserted jurisdiction
over the foreign corporation, although the cause of action arose in England.
'Old Wayne Mut. Life Ass'n of Indianapolis v. McDonough, 204 U. S. 8
(1907); Central Motor Lines v. Brooks Transportation Co., 225 N. C. 733, 36
S. E. 2d 271 (1945) ; Hamilton v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 220 N. C. 815, 18
S. E. 2d 367 (1942); King v. Robinson Transfer Motor Lines, 219 N. C. 223, 13
S. E. 2d 233 (1941). But cf. Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 72
S. Ct. 413 (1952). See also Note, 29 COL. L. REv. 187, 190 (1929).
" Perkins v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 94 F. Supp. 946 (S. D. Cal. 1951);
Harrison v. Corley, 226 N. C. 184, 37 S. E. 2d 489 (1946); Ruark v. Virginia
Trust Co., 206 N. C. 564, 174 S. E. 441 (1934). However, the mere shipment
of products into the state in interstate commerce is not "doing business." Cannon
Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U. S. 333 (1925).
1 E.g., Rosenburg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U. S. 516 (1923)
(president of the company was in New York briefly to purchase stock) ; Schoenith,
Inc. v. Adrian X-Ray Manufacturing Co., 220 N. C. 390, 17 S. E. 2d 350 (1941)
(director, at plaintiff's request, serviced the machine which his company had sold
to plaintiff). But cf. State Highway and Public Works Commission v. Diamond
Steamship Transportation Corp., 225 N. C. 198, 202, 34 S. E. 2d 78, 80 (1945),
where, in holding that a single extended trip by defendant's ship constituted "doing
busipess," the court stated: "The nature of the activities themselves, their magni-
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is generally considered by the "corporate presence" requirement to be
merely incidental to the main functions of a corporation, is not "doing
business."'1 2  However, when the company conducts other activities in
addition to solicitation, it may become amenable to the local jurisdic-
tion.13 The court in the instant case, having found no corporate activity
within the forum except solicitation, was dearly in accord with well-
established precedent in refusing to hold the service valid.
The standard applied by the court should be compared, however,
with the rule formulated by the United States Supreme Court in Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington.14  There, the foreign corporation
had engaged in enough acts in addition to solicitations to be considered
"present" and thus to be subject to the state unemployment compen-
sation tax.15 Yet, the Supreme Court did not employ the "corporate
presence" test. Rather, it ruled that jurisdictional requirements can
be met if the corporation's "operations establish sufficient contacts or
tude, the multiplicity of contacts, the possibility that incidents may occur and
liabilities be created-especially where the entrance into the state is in the ordinary
prosecution of the business which the corporation is chartered to carry on and is
carrying on; and which definitely regards the state as a theater for future trans-
actions of a like sort as often as occasion might arise-these are important con-
siderations in determining whether a corporation is, in a given instance, doing
business in the state. On a single visitation to the state the matter in hand may
explode into a multitude of transactions of far-reaching importance." Accord:
Lindner v. Plastic Toys, Inc., 96 N. Y. S. 2d 513 (City Ct. 1949) (company's
president maintained a hotel room for thirteen days to accept orders for his
product, and this was held to be "doing business").
2Green v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry., 205 U. S. 530 (1907) ; Radio
Station WMFR, Inc. v. Eitel-McCullough, Inc., 232 N. C. 287, 59 S. E. 2d 779
(1950); Schoenith, Inc. v. Adrian X-Ray Manufacturing Co., 220 N. C. 390, 17
S. E. 2d 350 (1941); Plott v. Michael, 214 N. C. 665, 200 S. E. 429 (1939);
Carnegie v. Art Metal Construction Co., 191 Va. 136, 60 S. E. 2d 17 (1950).
But cf. Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij v. Superior Court, 237 P. 2d 297
(Dist. Ct. App. Cal. 1951) (continuous solicitation is sufficient) ; American Asphalt
Roof Corp. v. Shankland, 205 Iowa 862, 219 N. W. 28 (1928) (continuous solicita-
tion resulting in deliveries within the state will support jurisdiction). Accord:
Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N. Y. 259, 115 N. E. 915 (1917).
" International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 205 U. S. 530 (1914) (agents re-
ceived payment in either money or notes) ; Barnett v. Texas & Pacific Ry., 145 F.
2d 800 (2d Cir. 1944) (agents sold tickets and issued bills of lading); State v.
Winsted, 66 Idaho 504, 162 P. 2d 894 (1945) (agents used cars owned and licensed
by the company); Lindner v. Plastic Toys, Inc., 96 N. Y. S. 2d 513 (City Ct.
1949) (agent's acceptance of orders was binding on the company); Parris v.
Fischer & Co., 219 N. C. 292, 13 S. E. 2d 540 (1941) (agent signed a conditional
sales contract in behalf of the company, visited plaintiff's residence twice to collect
back payments, and repossessed the machine on the second visit); Mauney v.
Luzier's, Inc., 212 N. C. 634, 194 S. E. 323 (1937) (agent collected payment for
the goods). But cf. Davega v. Lincoln Furniture Co., 29 F. 2d 164 (3d Cir.
1928); Pellegrini v. Roux Distributing Co., 170 Pa. Super. 68, 84 A. 2d 222(1951). See also Comment, 3 RuTGERS L. REv. 298 (1949).14326 U. S. 310 (1945).
15 International Shoe Co. v. State, 22 Wash. 2d 146, 154 P. 2d 801 (shoe com-
pany had from eleven to thirteen salesmen who resided in Washington, displayed
samples, occasionally rented permanent sample rooms or temporary space in




ties with the state of the forum to make it reasonable and just, accord-
ing to our traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice, to
permit the state to enforce the obligations which ... [the company] ...
has incurred there." '  The court indicated that the nature of the par-
ticular suit being brought is to be considered, and that "an estimate of
the inconveniences which would result to the corporation from a trial
away from its . .. principal place of business is relevant in this
connection." 17
Three basic differences between the "fair play and substantial justice"
rule of the International Shoe case and the older "corporate presence"
test can be detected. First, the newer rule provides a more direct and
realistic method of determining whether or not jurisdiction can be
asserted. Instead of following the circuitous route of deciding that the
corporation's activities are sufficient to constitute "doing business,"
which in turn manifests the "presence" of the company and makes it
amenable to local process, the "fair play and substantial justice" test
merely requires examination of the corporation's contacts with the
forum to decide whether they justify jurisdiction over the suit in
question. 8
A second difference is that the new rule makes allowance for the
origin of the cause of action. A dictum in the International Shoe case
suggests that a court can take jurisdiction over a foreign corporation
regardless of where or how the cause of action originated. It is indi-
cated however, that a greater amount of corporate activity within the
forum is necessary to meet constitutional requirements where the cause
of action arises outside of the forum than where the suit is based on
acts of the company within the state.'9 A recent decision by the
Supreme Court has since made the dictum law.20
"- International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310, 320 (1945).
17 326 U. S. at 317. "[This] question is certainly indistinguishable from the
issue of 'forum non conveniens." Kilpatrick v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 166 F. 2d
788 (2d Cir. 1948), criticized in 61 HAv. L. Rav. 1254, 1255 (1948).
" "Since the corporate persoriality is a fiction, although a fiction intended to
be acted upin as though it were a fact . . . it is clear that unlike an individual
its 'presence' . . . can be manifested only by activities carried on in its behalf by
those who are authorized to act for it. To say that the corporation is so far
'present' there as to satisfy due process requirements ... is to beg the question to
be decided. For the terms 'present' or 'presence' are used merely to symbolize
those activities of the corporation's agent within the state which courts will deem
to be sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process." 326 U. S. at 316.
"0 'While it has been held . . . that continuous activity of some sorts within
a state is not enough to support the demand that the corporation be amenable to
suits unrelated to that activity . . . . there have been instances in which the con-
tinuous corporate operations within a state were thought so substantial and of
such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from deal-
ings entirely distinct from those activities." 326 U. S. at 318.
20 Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 72 S. Ct. 413 (1952). Defend-
ant, a Philippine mining company, had been displaced by the Japanese invasion and
had transferred its limited wartime activities to Ohio, where its president and
1952]
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The third difference is that the "fair play and substantial justice"
test would seem to indicate that courts may now exercise wider juris-
diction over foreign corporations.2 1 Although not specifically overruled
in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, the "mere solicitation" rule
seems abrogated by the new test. In modern business, solicitation is a
substantial and vital part of the activities of a corporation.2 2  Further-
general manager resided. It maintained two bank accounts in Ohio, carried on
correspondence, and held several directors' meetings there. Nevertheless, the Ohio
courts refused to accept jurisdiction over it in a suit for unpaid dividends and
damages caused by failure to issue stock certificates because the cause of action
arose outside of the state. In vacating judgment and remanding for further pro-
ceedings, the United States Supreme Court ruled that, although it could not order
the Ohio courts to take jurisdiction, it could not prevent them from summoning
the corporation, because the activities in Ohio were sufficient to justify jurisdiction,
even where the cause of action arose from outside, unrelated conduct. The decision
did not indicate, however, what minimum of activity would be required before
jurisdiction over such a cause of action would be constitutional; and the unusual
magnitude of the defendant's forum operations in the case casts no light on this
point.
2 The "minimum contacts" requirement appears to demand a lesser degree of
forum activity than is indicated by the term "corporate presence." In addition,
it seems significant that the court stressed the fact that service on the agent in
the case being considered would certainly give the corporation sufficient notice
of the suit. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310, 320 (1945).
Also compare Travelers Health Assn v. Virginia, 339 U. S. 643 (1950) with
Minnesota Commercial Men's Ass'n v. Benn, 261 U. S. 140 (1923) (a decision
under the "corporate presence" rule). See Comment, 41 ILL L. REv. 228, 236(1946); Note, 16 U. oF CH. L. REv. 523, 525 (1949); 3 RuTGERS L. REV. 298,
300 (1949).
There is argument that "fair play" requires subjection of the foreign cor-
poration to the jurisdiction whenever it commits a tort within the state against
a resident, or breaches a contract which is to be performed in whole or in part
within the forum. See McBaine, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations; Actions
Arising Out of Acts Done Within tre Forum, 34 CALIF. L. RZEv. 331, 336 (1946) ;
Note, 39 Ky. L. J. 357, 362 (1951). Such a rule, it is said, would be less vague
than either of the present rules, and therefore would be easier to apply. Further-
more, due process would be observed as long as the court made certain that the
corporation received actual notice. The 'non-resident motorist statutes are cited
in support of this point. See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352 (1927). Normally,
no hardship would result under the proposed rule, it is said, since usually most
of the witnesses will reside within the forum. In the few cases where the foreign
corporation would suffer unduly from suit away from its "home," the doctrine offorum non conveniens might be applied. Two state courts have applied rules,
based upon local statutes, which come close to adopting this attitude. See Johns
v. Bay State Abrasive Products Co., 89 F. Supp. 654 (D. Md. 1950), discussed
in Comment, 64 HAxv. L. Ruv. 500 (1951) and Note, 20 U. oF CIN. L. Rlv. 129
(1951). Cf. Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A. 2d 664
(1951).
While there is as yet no indication that the United States Supreme Court will
allow such broad jurisdiction, the language of the Vermont court appears sig-
nificant: "We recognize that there is a dual trend in jurisdictional decisions: in
defining the court with jurisdiction, a trend away from the court with immediate
power over the defendant to the court where both parties may most conveniently
settle their dispute; and in defining due process of law, a trend from emphasis on
the territorial limitations of courts to emphasis on providing notice and oppor-
tunity to be heard. The implications of International Shoe Co v. State of Wash-
ington are a part of this dual trend. Its broad standard we expect will prevail.
Any change will be, most likely, a further extension." 116 Vt. at 575, 80 A.
2d at 668.
" "Solicitation without . . . additional activities . . . may be more sustained,
(Vol. 30
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more, under the older rule it may be possible for a corporation, by
merely making all orders obtained by its agents subject to approval at
the home office, to procure a large amount of business from a state,
while remaining immune from suit in the local courts.m Gradually, the
courts appear to be reaching the conclusion that "fair play" requires
that the corporation submit to the jurisdiction where the solicitation con-
ducted by it is extensive2 4
The distinction between continuous activities and isolated acts is pre-
served in the "fair play and substanital justice" test, which holds that
isolated activities ordinarily do not furnish sufficient contacts.25 How-
ever, the language in the International Shoe decision did leave the possi-
bility open that certain isolated acts "because of their nature and quality
and the circumstances, may be deemed sufficient to render the corpora-
tion liable to Suit."' 2 6 Also, it is possible that the broader exercise of
jurisdiction possible under the new rule may influence courts to be less
willing to label a corporation's forum activity as "isolated acts."
The broad language of the "fair play and substantial justice rule is
more insistent, more productive of business than it is with them. Solicitation is
the foundation of sales. Completing the contract often is a mere formality when
the stage of 'selling' the customer has been passed. No business man would re-
gard 'selling,' the 'taking of orders,' 'solicitation' as not doing business. The
merchant or manufacturer considers these things the heart of business." Frene
v. Louisville Cement Co., 134 F. 2d 511, 516 (D. C. Cir. 1943).
"'In Lutz v. Foster & Kester Co., 367 Pa. 125, 79 A. 2d 222 (1951), the
defendant company rented, equipped, and maintained an office in Philadelphia,
employing a staff of six persons, including a district sales manager. In addition
to soliciting business, the office transmtted complaints to the home office in Con-
necticut and contacted it to expedite local deliveries. Defendant's customers can-
celled orders through this branch office, called there to transact business, and sent
drawings and blueprints to it. The branch office also handled settlement of diffi-
culties created by shipment of defective materials, exhibited samples of defend-
ant's products, and processed all orders received from defendant's local distributors.
Yet, because all orders taken at the branch office were subject to final approval at
the Connecticut office, the Pennsylvania court refused to allow jurisdiction, ruling:
"The criterion is ...whether the local solicitors have authority to bind the
corporation by which they are employed." 367 Pa. at 129, 79 A. 2d at 224. See
also Pellegrini v. Roux Distributing Co., 170 Pa. Super. 68, 84 A. 2d 222 (1951).2 Kilpatrick v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 166 F. 2d 788 (2d Cir.), cert. dent., 335
U. S. 814 (1948) ; Star Elkhorn Coal Co. v. Red Ash Pocahontas Coal Co., 102
F. Supp. 258 (E. D. Ky. 1951); Perkins v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 94 F. Supp.
946 (S. D. Cal. 1951); Western Smelting & Refining Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co.,
81 F. Supp. 494 (D. C. 1948); Schmikler v. Petersine Insulator Co., 77 F. Supp.
11 (D. Mass. 1948); Boyd v. Warren Paint & Color Co., 254 Ala. 687, 49 So.
2d 559 (1950). But cf. Toothill v. Raymond Laboratories, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 350
(E. D. N. Y. 1951); Anderson v. Page & Hill Homes, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 408
(D. N. D. 1950); Bomze v. Nardis Sportswear, Inc., 68 F. Supp. 156 (S. D.
N. Y. 1946) ("This case is a step backward from the implications of International
Shoe Co. v. Washington." 60 HARv. L. REv. 654 (1947)) ; Jacobs v. Horan En-
graving Co., 137 N. J. L. 520, 61 A. 2d 22 (Sup. Ct. 1948); Cohen v. Gulf,
Mobile & Ohio R. Co., 95 N. Y. S. 2d 633 (Sup. Ct. 1950) ; Law v. Atlantic Coast
Line R. Co., 367 Pa. 170, 79 A. 2d 252 (1951) ; Hoffman v. D. Landreth Seed
Co., 66 S. E. 2d 813 (S. C. 1951).5 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310, 317 (1945).
20 326 U. S. at 318.
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vague, and therefore may well form the basis for disagreements as to
the result of its application in specific situations. Indeed, the decision
in the instant case might easily have been the same had the new rule been
used by the court. But it would seem that, although the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court is not alone in speaking in terms of "corporate
presence" and "mere solicitation,"-2 7 it would have a fairer and more
effective means of approaching future cases of this type if it employed
the rule and language of the International Shoe case.
JOHN G. GoLmNG.
Sheriffs--Relationship to and Liability for Deputy
The office of deputy sheriff is ". . coeval in point of antiquity
with the sheriff"1 and as such is one of the oldest in the common law
system of jurisprudence. 2 Although some states provide for deputies
sheriff by statute,8 in North Carolina it remains a common law office.
4
The exact relationship between the sheriff and his deputy was not
dearly defined until Styers v. Forsyth County,5 in which Stacy, C. J.
stated:
"Under our law a deputy is authorized to act only in minis-
terial matters, and in respect of these matters he acts as vice
principal or alter ego of the sheriff, for the sheriff 'and his deputy
be, in the contemplation of law, one person.' . . . In short, a
deputy is a lieutenant, the sheriff's right hand man. . . . To call
him an under sheriff . . . is more nearly correct than to style
him an employee." 6
"E.g., Westerdale v. Kaiser-Frazer Corp., 6 N. J. 571, 80 A. 2d 91 (Sup.
Ct. 1951); Vassallo v. Slomin, 105 N. Y. S. 2d 60, 278 App. Div. 949 (2d Dept.
1951); Allentown Record Co., Inc. v. Agrashell, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 790 (E. D.
Penn. 1951). See also note 24 supra.
'Lanier v. Greenville, 174 N. C. 311, 316, 93 S. E. 850, 853 (1917).
21 ANDERSON ON Sxamirirs §2 (1st ed. 1941) ; Boland, The Ancient Office of
Sheriff, 211 L. T. 177 (1951), ". . . the office of sheriff is, except for kingship,
the oldest office in the country and the only secular office remaining from Saxon
times! '
847 Am. JUR. §154 (1943) ; 1 ANDERSON ON SHERrrs §60 (1st ed. 1941).
'There is no provision for the office of deputy sheriff in either the constitu-
tion (Gowans v. Alamance County, 216 N. C. 107, 3 S. E. 2d 339 (1939)), or
the statutes (Borders v. Cline, 212 N. C. 472, 193 S. E. 286 (1937); Jamesville
& Washington R.R. v. Fisher, 109 N. C. 1, 13 S. E. 698 (1891)), except where
modified by public-local law. See note 10 infra.
212 N. C. 558, 194 S. E. 305 (1937).
212 N. C. at 564, 194 S. E. 308. The court describes the deputy by four
terms, the total of which would seem to embrace the definition of the office:
". .. he acts as 'vice-principal'" (one to whom the employer has confided the
entire charge of the business or a district branch of it, or one to whom the master
has delegated a duty of his own which is a direct personal and absolute obligation.
Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed., 1951)) ; "alter ego" ("second self." Webster's
Collegiate Dictionary, 5th ed. (1945)); "a lieutenant" ("one who holds the post
or office of another, in the place and stead of the latter." Black's Law Dictionary
(4th ed., 1951)) ; "the sheriff's right hand man" ("one chiefly relied on." Web-
ster's Collegiate Dictionary (5th ed., 1945.)).
[Vol. 30
